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Notre Europe is an independent think tank devoted to European integration. 
Under the guidance of Jacques Delors, who created Notre Europe in 1996, 
the association aims to “think a united Europe”. 
Our ambition is to contribute to the current public debate by producing 
analyses and pertinent policy proposals that strive for a closer union of 
the peoples of Europe. We are equally devoted to promoting the active 
engagement of citizens and civil society in the process of community 
construction and the creation of a European public space. 
In this vein, the staff of Notre Europe directs research projects; produces 
and disseminates analyses in the form of short notes, studies, and articles; 
and organises public debates and seminars. Its analyses and proposals 
are concentrated around four themes:
• Visions of Europe: The community method, the enlargement and 
deepening of the EU and the European project as a whole are a work in 
constant progress. Notre Europe provides in-depth analysis and proposals 
that help find a path through the multitude of Europe’s possible futures.
• European Democracy in Action: Democracy is an everyday priority. Notre 
Europe believes that European integration is a matter for every citizen, 
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actor of civil society and level of authority within the Union. Notre Europe 
therefore seeks to identify and promote ways of further democratising 
European governance. 
• Cooperation, Competition, Solidarity: « Competition that stimulates, co-
operation that strengthens, and solidarity that unites ». This, in essence, is 
the European contract as defined by Jacques Delors. True to this approach, 
Notre Europe explores and promotes innovative solutions in the fields of 
economic, social and sustainable development policy.
• Europe and World Governance: As an original model of governance in 
an increasingly open world, the European Union has a role to play on the 
international scene and in matters of world governance. Notre Europe seeks 
to help define this role.
Notre Europe aims for complete freedom of thought and works in the spirit of 
the public good.  It is for this reason that all of Notre Europe’s publications 
are available for free from our website, in both French and English: www.notre-
europe.eu. Its Presidents have been successively, Jacques Delors (1996-2004), 
Pascal Lamy (2004-05), and Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa (since November 
2005).
Summary
The proposed solutions towards pulling through the European crisis 
caused by the French and Dutch rejections of the Constitutional Treaty 
focussed on the Treaty provisions which were to be upheld. They never, 
or very seldom, addressed the issue of the method that should be used to 
organise this new negotiation. Yet the citizens’ disenchantment with the 
European project, observable from the early nineties, requires recognition 
of the necessity to associate those citizens to European decision making, 
and in particular to the revision of such founding acts as the European 
Treaties.
The Convention approach, warts and all, was an essential step towards the 
democratisation of the Treaties’ revision process. Whilst the Lisbon Treaty 
provides for it to become standard procedure for the reform of all signifi-
cant treaties, its implementation remains in doubt, tributary to Heads of 
State and Government’s say-so. Accordingly, this paper has two aims: on 
the one hand, it will promote the Convention model, asserting its advan-
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tages over the time-honoured Intergovernmental Conferences and, on the 
other hand, set forth solutions to improve its operations both in terms of 
democracy and efficiency.
Far from being an accident in the history of European integration, the 
Convention is indeed one of its achievements, a crucial stage in the bringing 
together of Europe’s elites and citizens. Its pragmatic model reflects the 
double legitimacy of a Union of States and citizens. Thus, the Convention, 
which yielded the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Constitutional 
Treaty turned out to be a body rich in its cleavages, conductive to fruitful 
debates, open to the public, the media and civil society. It ran effective 
deliberations and arrived at a consensual result, lifting constitutional 
blockages which had held back Community dynamics for years.
However, the Convention model has been through only two runs, under 
very different mandates. It was the butt of a number of criticisms, some 
of which were justified. It is therefore important to look into the means to 
improve its operation, in the most feasible way compatible with the new 
terms under the Lisbon Treaty. The proposals outlined in this text address 
five key points, fundamental to the future of the Convention: its compo-
sition, its Praesidium, its mandate, its schedule, its debating formula, its 
exchanges with civil society, its visibility to the general public and finally 
its relationship with the IGC and its implications for the ratification phase.
The reader will find in particular the following proposals: allowing for the 
representatives from the National Parliaments to be elected in the Member 
States who so wish; getting the Convention to approve the European 
Council’s appointment of the Chairman and Vice-Chairmen triumvirate and 
making the workings of the Praesidium more collegial; ensuring that this 
consensus driven decision making formula be as fair as possible; entrus-
ting to a group of Wise Men the decisions concerning the Convention’s 
mandate and work schedule; setting up mechanisms genuinely suited to 
exchanges with civil society and citizens’ involvement on a local as well 
as a European scale. This text concludes with a very practical proposal: 
the convocation of a Convention on EU policies after the 2009 European 
elections.
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Introduction
After the French and Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty and the sus-
pension by seven Member States of their ratification process, the solutions 
proposed here and there to exit the European crisis were many and manifold. 
The 18 countries having ratified the Draft Treaty called for upholding its 
“substance” whereas, in France and elsewhere, a scheme for the prompt 
adoption of a strictly institutional text gained ground. The three countries most 
refractory to institutional advances – the UK, Poland and the Czech Republic 
– sought to retrieve from the rubble a minimalist Treaty which would have 
enabled them to weaken, indeed to suppress the provisions they perceived 
as most inconvenient. The new “Reform Treaty” is in some way a synthesis of 
these three positions.
In spite of differences, all the stated options had the common merit of addres-
sing mainly what in the Constitutional Treaty would need to be revised, at best 
including the ratification formula for this new text. But, strangely enough, 
they all afforded but scant attention to the method to be used to organise this 
new negotiation. The problem often appeared as minor, or else, with in mind 
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the urgent need to find a re-launch solution, it was dismissed on the grounds 
that the only way forward was through a short Intergovernmental Conference1 
mandated to arrive at a fresh political trade-off. Some mooted the idea of a 
Convention as a further stage towards a more significant revision of the funda-
mental texts; this would have the benefit, through the discussion of EU policies, 
to launch a great debate on what the Europeans really want to do together. 
Those behind this idea – among which the French Government – soon gave up 
on it and had little to say about the added value of a Convention or the way they 
envisage its role and operations.
And yet, the debate on the way to revise European treaties is vital to the future 
of European integration. Among all the reasons explaining the rejection of the 
Treaty, the one concerning “public disengagement” with the European Project 
is one of the very few common strands to the French and Dutch contexts. Now, 
this “public disenchantment” is in fact a phenomenon which has emerged in 
the European Union over the last 15 years and which accounts to a great extent 
for the identity malaise experienced by all EU citizens in today’s globalised 
environment. If remedying this growing gap between the European construc-
tion and the citizenry on which it is supposed to rest is deemed paramount, 
one cannot dispense with probing the ways to associate the citizens to the 
most fundamental act of this Construction, namely the revision of the texts 
which frame it.2
The Convention approach, with its strengths and weaknesses, has been a 
crucial step towards a democratisation of the Treaty revision process. If the 
Reform Treaty is ratified, it will even become the “ordinary” process adopted for 
1 Conference of the governments of the Member States convened in order to negotiate amendments 
to existing treaties.
2 The measures to take in order to reduce the growing gap between citizens and the European pro-
ject obviously go well beyond the methodology Treaty revision.
any far reaching revision.3 In a first section, we shall address the basic reasons 
that incline us to uphold this model and to wish for it to endure. However, the 
operations of the latest Convention also raised many questions regarding effi-
ciency as well as democracy. It is not possible to advocate the Convention 
approach without taking into account these criticisms and reservations and 
without suggesting solutions for its improvement.4 Those are developed in the 
second section. It is only in this manner, with a new legitimacy that the Conven-
tion will be able to find its place in the European institutional landscape.
3 According to Article 48 of the EUT as modified by the Lisbon Treaty, treaties can be modified in 
accordance with ordinary or simplified revision procedures.  The ordinary revision procedure is as 
follows: the government of any Member State, the European Parliament, or the Commission can sub-
mit bills towards the revision of the treaties to the Council. These bills may, inter alia, push for the 
increase or reduction of competences granted the Union in the treaties. These bills are transmitted 
by the Council to the European Council and notified to National Parliaments. If the European Council, 
after consultation with the European Parliament and the Commission, passes by simple majority a 
decision in favour of the examination of the proposed modification, the President of the European 
Council calls a Convention made up with representatives from the National Parliaments, the Heads 
of State or Government of the Member States, the European Parliament and the Commission. The 
European Central Bank is also consulted in the event of institutional modifications of a monetary 
nature. The Convention reviews the revision bills and adopts by consensus a recommendation 
for a Conference of the representatives of the governments of the Member States. The European 
Council may decide by simple majority, upon approbation by the European Parliament, not to call 
the Convention when the scale of modification does not require it. In this latter event, the European 
Council establishes the mandate for a Conference of the representatives of the governments of the 
Member States.
4 It should be made clear that the improvement proposals set forth in this text are compatible with 
the new arrangements for the revision of treaties provided in the Lisbon Treaty.
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I - Six arguments towards upholding the Convention 
Model
Before looking into the weaknesses of the Convention model, it behoves 
to recall its assets and the progress it represents for the EU in terms of 
democracy and efficiency. The virtues of the Convention cannot be stated 
too often as, through the same device which was seen in operation with 
regards to the Constitutional Treaty, those who criticise it on the grounds 
that the system does not go far enough, contribute in effect to preserve 
the status quo in the shape of Diplomatic Intergovernmental Conferences 
(IGC). Yet IGC proceedings never fail to show that the system favours those 
Member States who, in the name of this or that national interest, wield 
their veto, with scant regard for general European interests. This, over and 
above holding back the European construction – which some may consider 
desirable – often results in preventing its democratisation – which is not 
outwardly the aim of any Eurosceptic. It is also worth recalling that the 
Heads of Government themselves, at Nice then at Laeken, acknowledged 
the limitations of the IGC as a means to extract the EU from the institutio-
nal deadlock it had got itself into on the eve of the most important enlarge-
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ment it had ever known. There is no reason why the Convention should go 
the way of the Constitutional Treaty which it devised – quite successfully 
at that.
Even if it should henceforward – provided the Reform Treaty comes into 
force – become standard for any treaty reform of some importance, its use 
remains tributary to the Heads of State and Government say-so. Now, they 
have become aware, on the two occasions when this method has been 
used, that the Convention caused them to lose some of the control they are 
used to hold over treaty revision in favour of a system more open to public 
debate. They are not going to be in a great rush to use it. The Convention 
approach must therefore be defended for its obvious qualities in order that 
it becomes gradually a requisite within the European institutional system.
1.1. A historical stage in the European Construction 
Outwardly, the convention on the future of Europe was relatively short-
lived, from February 2002 to July 2003, so that it could appear as one of 
many episodes in the European construction, no doubt interesting but over 
and done with. But it did not fall from the sky and, in order to understand 
its importance in the history of European integration, we shall do well to 
remember where it came from and why. Actually, the reasons of its origins 
go back a long way. Alain Dauvergne (2004) rightly accounts for its genesis 
by taking us back some twelve years, somewhere in the mid-nineties. The 
year 1994 is a turning point; marking the end of the Delors Commission 
and the European dynamism associated with it, it witnessed the failure 
of German Christian-Democrats Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers’ 
proposals for the creation of a “hard core” and the enlargement from 12 
to 15 Member States. It ushered in the long probing of reforms needed by 
Europe and a string of fruitless attempts to reform the institutions.
The Treaty on European Union (Maastricht Treaty), came into force in 1993, 
already provided for the convocation of an Intergovernmental Conference 
with a view to revise some of its provisions. The Treaty of Amsterdam, taking 
force in 1997 after two years of studies and negotiations within an IGC did 
not achieve a settlement of all the issues pertaining to the workings of the 
Union. For it left unresolved a number of points going under the name of 
“Amsterdam leftovers”: size and composition of the Commission, weighting 
of States’ vote at the Council and shift from unanimity to qualified majority 
voting in a number of fields. Thus, ten months only after the coming into 
force of the new Treaty, a further ICG was called. It was to be short: taking 
place from February to December 2000, it would be remembered by those 
who took part in as by those who observed it as the most disappointing in 
integration history.
In this respect, Nice heralded a real shift. The negotiations slid into horse-
trading to a point probably never reached previously. The results wrangled 
at the dead of night – more for fear of unpreparedness for an unpreceden-
ted enlargement than for the sake of a common vision – were almost una-
nimously considered as inadequate and warped. As they left the European 
Council in the small hours, the Heads of State and Government themselves 
expressed their intent to change their working method. Tony Blair’s “we 
can’t go on like this”, coming from such a champion of intergovernmental 
decision-making was undoubtedly the most indicative of the general state 
of mind inside the European Council.
This dissatisfaction actually found its way into a written Declaration “on 
the future of the Union” annexed to the Treaty and calling for a deeper 
and wider debate on the future of the European Union, involving National 
Parliaments and public opinion as a whole, along with the applicant 
countries. It also provided for the adoption by the Council at its December 
2001 Laeken meeting under Belgian Presidency, of a declaration contai-
ning “appropriate initiatives for the continuation of this process” which 
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should address, inter alia, four issues: a more precise delimitation of 
powers between the European Union and the Member States; the status 
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; the simplifi-
cation of the Treaties and the role of National Parliaments in the European 
architecture.
However, this resolve to change tack did not stem from the feeling of frus-
tration among IGC participants alone. The nineties also open a new era 
in the European construction, when the gap gradually grows between 
the citizens and the European project. It is indeed at the beginning of 
the nineties that the Eurobarometer surveys begin to show a drop in the 
support for joining the EU, which had been rising fairly steadily since 1973, 
peaking at 70% in 1990 to hover today around 50%. One specialist of 
European public opinion, Bruno Cautrès, identifies the Maastricht Treaty 
period (1991/92) as a turning point for integration, marking the end of the 
“permissive consensus” which had hitherto been the hallmark of the rela-
tionship between European decision makers and citizens. As Peter Norman 
(2005) points out, participation to European elections in June 1999 fell for 
the first time below 50%.
By 2001, this trend had therefore been perceptible for 10 years and 
started to give cause for concerns. As Jacques Delors emphasises in his 
preface for Alain Dauvergne (2004): “As the EU intervenes more manifest-
ly in Europeans’ life but in more opaque conditions, there are not many 
citizens in a position to say ‘who does what’ and ‘who controls whom’. 
For want of fostering the conditions for its democratic support, the EU, no 
longer an object of soft consensus has become the butt of harsh disputes. 
In fact, since Maastricht, the ratification of treaty modifications has grown 
increasingly dicey and the impending expansion to 25 members makes the 
exercise virtually unthinkable.”
In this context, should the Nice Declaration lead to the convocation of a 
new ICG in 2004, the members of the European Council further accepted 
the “need to improve and to monitor the democratic legitimacy and trans-
parency of the Union and its institutions, to bring them closer to the 
citizens of the Member States” That is why the Laeken Declaration on the 
Future of the European Union, a document of some breadth, adopted on 
the occasion of the December 2001 European Council provided, “in order 
to pave the way for the next Intergovernmental Conference as broadly and 
openly as possible”, for the gathering of a Convention “composed of the 
main parties involved in the debate on the future of the Union”.
The Convention object is not unidentified since it had a precedent. Indeed, 
in June 1999, at the Cologne European Council, the 15 had set up a “body” 
composed of “representatives of the Heads of State and Government and 
of the President of the Commission as well as of members of the European 
Parliament and National Parliaments” to draft the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. This body would take for itself the name 
of “convention” and would prove a success since it was to achieve the 
feat of submitting a text which, short of being included in the Treaties, in 
deference to British reluctance, would result in an official proclamation in 
Nice without any Head of State and Government seeking to alter it by an 
iota.
Beside this impressive achievement, the “Charter” Convention was mostly 
applauded for its deliberative style and a transparency in sharp contrast 
with the diplomatic wheeling and dealing and opacity customary to IGCs. 
In Jacques Delors’ words (Dauvergne 2004), « the Convention formula won 
the day because the issue of the Union’s ‘democratic deficit’ in a climate of 
‘democratic disillusionment’ in most Member States has become crucial”. 
Far from being an accident in the history of integration, the Convention is 
in reality one of its achievements.
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1.2. A democratic body, prolifically divided 
Contrary to what some may have claimed during the 2005 referendum 
campaigns, particularly in France, the Convention on the Future of Europe, 
which started its proceedings on 28 February 2002 in Brussels was a demo-
cratic body. Its composition, reproducing to a great extent the “Charter” 
Convention, rested essentially on three types of representation, the demo-
cratic legitimacy of which can hardly be questioned: national governments 
representatives (15 of them, that is one per then Member State), MEPs 
(16) and national MPs (30, that is two per Member State so as to take into 
account double chamber systems where they occurred). 
The European Commission was represented by two Commissioners, 
Antonio Vitorino (Justice and Home Affairs) and Michel Barnier (insti-
tutions et Regional policies). Unlike its forerunner, the Convention on 
the Future of Europe also included representatives from the applicant 
countries (amounting to 13 including Turkey): one per government and 
two per parliament, with a slightly different status since they could not 
forestall a consensus emerging among Member States. To those were 
added Chairman Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, and Vice-Chairmen Jean-Luc 
Dehaene and Giuliano Amato, nominated by the European Council, coming 
to a total of 105 full members. In practice, however the distinction between 
those members and their alternates5 proved academic. Including the 13 
observers from the Economic and Social Council, the European social 
partners and the Committee of the Regions, the convention assembly 
numbered 220 people.
By its make-up, the Convention proved a novel, groundbreaking model, as 
compared with Intergovernmental Conferences’ current practice. For the 
latter operate on the basis of diplomatic transactions between sovereign 
States, thus requiring unanimous decisions, and it is made up strictly 
5 The President and Vice-Presidents did not have alternates.
from national governments representatives. The Convention was open 
to members of parliament, hailing – in an interesting innovation – both 
from the institution representing the citizens at European level and from 
the national legislative assemblies. It established a deliberative mode of 
decision making by consensus, generating much more fertile and varied 
cleavages and alliances than a classical IGC.
Indeed, conflicts between national interests were overlapped by at least 
two other types of cleavage: along “components” lines (government 
representatives, MEPs, national MPs) in the Convention and along party 
political lines (that is, for European parties, the European People’s Party, 
the Socialist Group, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, the 
Green etc.). Furthermore, national delegations were comprised of represen-
tatives from the governing majority as well as from the opposition. Before 
plenary sessions, Conventionals met both by institutional component 
and by political affiliation. Taking their seat by alphabetical order rather 
than aligning from the outset on one of the three cleavages, the conven-
tion opened up the range of possible alliances; this turned the zero sum 
game Intergovernmental Conference negotiations are often reduced to 
into variable geometry debates, the intertwining of which often proved 
extremely fertile.
As Florence Deloche-Gaudez (2007) stresses, «the break-through brought 
about by the Convention was not so much down to the nature of the 
cleavages (be they institutional, national or political) than to their co-
existence and overlap”. The complexity of those cleavages no doubt made 
the Praesidium’s task more difficult but it is also to a large extent thanks to 
their richness that it was possible to reach beyond the limitations of diplo-
matic negotiation. “Strong in their association to several types of groups 
(countries, parties, institutions), members could ‘change hat’ to support 
such and such position and increase the support it enjoyed” (Deloche-
Gaudez 2007). Notably, as will be shown, the Convention made possible 
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a settlement on institutional matters in contention for over ten years, such 
as the voting system and the weighting of votes at the Council.
Many observed, for instance, Peter Hain’s change of attitude; the British 
government’s representative, when he saw that a strictly national strategy 
was wearing thin, tried hard to form different types of coalition. The arrival 
en route of such political heavy weights as the French or German Foreign 
Minister may have looked like attempts to steer the debates along more 
intergovernmental lines. But it no less signalled the Member States’ reali-
sation that public deliberation within the Convention was likely to be more 
effective that 10 years of diplomatic conferences and that they had better 
“join in”.
1.3. A model founded in the Union’s double legitimacy
For all its innovative fibre, the Convention was sometimes criticised because 
of its hybrid nature, halfway between an IGC and a Constituent Assembly. 
Many would argue that the latter model, that of an Assembly composed 
exclusively of parliamentarians elected for this express purpose, is the 
only one acceptable to conceive a revision of the Treaties that remained 
totally legitimate at a democratic level and liable to lead to the adoption 
of a European Constitution. Yet this is a debatable point if the object is 
not only to remain pragmatic but also to stay true to the nature of the EU 
system.
The debate on the suitability of a Constituent Assembly is not new. The 
most orthodox federalists have often called for the adoption of a European 
Constitution via a genuine Constituent Assembly. Altiero Spinelli, a 
doughty opponent of fascism and European parliamentarian was one 
of its greatest exponents throughout his political career. As early as the 
fifties, following France’s rejection of the EDC Treaty, the European fede-
ralist movement proposed, under Spinelli’s aegis, to turn directly to the 
citizens with a view to call a European Constituent Assembly. As soon as 
the European Parliament was elected directly, in 1979, Spinelli started the 
fight to turn the European Parliament into a Constituent Assembly. In 1984, 
he succeeded in having a draft treaty for the European Union adopted; it 
did not come to fruition but it undoubtedly contributed to the considera-
tions towards an institutional re-launch. The idea of a Constituent Assembly 
regularly crops up when a democratic approach to the review of the funda-
mental treaties is being debated.
Yet, there is no escaping the fact that for all its allure, the Constituent 
Assembly project has never taken off. The Convention, meanwhile, has 
chalked up two achievements and its hybrid nature has been a key to 
its success. The European Union’s legitimacy is twofold, founded in the 
citizens’ and the States’ consent. The Convention draws its strength from 
the fact that it accounts, all in all quite even-handedly, for this double legi-
timacy, combining as it does representation from national and European 
parliaments with that from governments. Excluding the latter from the 
process would be tantamount to disregarding the nature of the EU’s 
political system as it was first conceived and as it will continue to develop 
towards what Jacques Delors called a “Federation of Nation States”.
Besides, for as long as the EU founding texts come in the shape of treaties, 
they will have to be approved by the Member States via an Intergovernmental 
Conference and mere pragmatism induces us to reckon that this state of 
affairs is there to stay. An IGC will therefore have to take place to enact the 
Convention’s transactions and it would seem more constructive, under the 
circumstances, and more interesting, to associate representatives from 
the governments to the Convention’s debates. They may, in that way, not 
only feel more bound by them but also be both convinced and constrained 
by the deliberation process described above.
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1.4. Consensus or the veto in question
Decision making by consensus became pre-requisite to the Convention 
for two reasons: first as a legacy from the Charter Convention which, as 
F. Deloche-Gaudez (2007) reminds us, began its proceedings with a few 
votes but concluded that they were unworkable (translation problems, 
confusion as to what the vote was about, divergent results etc.) and turned 
to consensus dynamics instead. The second reason is linked to the relative 
disparity between convention components: with members representing 
the governments being in the smallest, it would have been difficult to come 
up with a voting system wholly excluding Member State’s weighted votes 
(vote weighting being systematic at the Council). Meanwhile, the Laeken 
Declaration invoked consensus in two provisions: that candidate countries 
could not stall a “consensus” emerging between Member States for one 
and that the Convention produced a final document to be drafted either as 
a range of options or of recommendations “in the event of a consensus” 
for the other. 
In the first as in the second Convention, this consensus working model was 
in fact rather hazy. President Giscard d’Estaing simply made it clear that he 
wished to “allow for the Convention to ripen” rather than resort to the vote. 
There were calls for the retention of the vote option, if only for indicative 
purposes but they went unheeded. It is generally accepted that consensus 
consolidates somewhere between majority and unanimity and closer to 
the latter. It is, so to speak, the absence of apparent dissent. It is patently 
clear that consensus is not unanimity and, on that count, the Convention 
was as distinct as could be from an IGC.
Consensus decision making is not without its own weaknesses and we 
shall return to them but it does have the crucial advantage of calling into 
question a Member State’s absolute right of veto which makes classical 
Intergovernmental negotiation sterile and which unfailingly gives the 
upper hand to the country threatening to use this right. In both Convention 
outings, the consensus rule made it possible to achieve a result leaving 
a weak opposition behind. In the case of the Convention on the Future 
of Europe, only one “minority report” was adopted by eight Eurosceptic 
members (four full members and four alternates) complaining of the poor 
representation of their movement.
1.5. Opening up to civil society and debates transparency 
Therein undoubtedly rests the major argument in favour of the convention 
approach to the revision of European treaties. Even if a degree of inter-
governmental dynamics is prerequisite in a system based on the interna-
tional treaty instrument, the opacity which appears inherent to diplomatic 
negotiations becomes more and more questionable. An IGC meets behind 
closed doors whether at the technical or political stage and the informa-
tion trickling through via the media focuses on the power games and the 
minutiae of national interests without the benefit of any overview.
The great asset of the Convention is not only the opening of its debates to 
the public but also its efforts to take into account, via a range of mecha-
nisms, the positions of civil society. The activities of the Convention 
started with a long listening phase, indeed, some thought, too long. One 
of the Vice-Chairmen, Jean-Luc Dehaene had the task of dialoguing with 
civil society specified in his brief. Besides the setting up of an online forum 
where it was possible to leave a written contribution, two more “formal” 
consultations were organised: a hearing of civil society organisations in 
June 2002 and a “youth” Convention in July 2002. By and large, with all 
Convention documents being accessible, it was easier for debate partici-
pants to react through making contact, be it informal, with any number of 
Convention delegates.
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This hearing of civil society caused frustration in both quarters and we 
shall take another look at how to turn this hearing into a genuine exchange. 
Neither was the Convention’s visibility to the public at large sufficient. 
But still, the qualitative leap brought about by the Convention in terms of 
openness and transparency by comparison with IGC is enormous. Among 
the factors increasingly driving apart citizens and European construc-
tion, the sense that the decision making process is opaque and the lack 
of democratic vectors towards influencing it appear to play a major role. So 
that the exposure given the deliberations affecting the revision of the EU’s 
founding texts is no luxury, it corresponds to a vital necessity for the future 
of the European project.
1.6. Achieving results
This may not appear as the most obvious point in favour of the Convention 
approach. Yet, under closer scrutiny, the effectiveness of conventions is 
superior to that of the IGCs that came before or after them. As we pointed 
out earlier, the European Council had been trying over some twelve years, 
from one IGC to the next, to solve a number of equations fundamental to 
the future of a Union whose number of Member States was about to double. 
The question of institutional balance – between old and new Member 
States, between small and large countries, between federalists and inter-
governmentalists – had come to seem devoid of any solution.
Part 1 of the Constitutional Treaty was not perfect but it had the merit to 
propose a cogent compromise to these institutional issues. This compromi-
se has incidentally been subsumed, for the best part in the Reform Treaty. 
Advances which had hitherto appeared unlikely, such as the suppression 
of the treaties’ three pillars structure, the granting of juridical personality 
to the Union or even the reduction of the size of the Commission can be 
quoted as examples of the Convention’s ability do deliver. Conventionals 
freely admit that Part 3 of the Constitutional Treaty on EU policies left 
something to be desired but it should be remembered that the Convention 
mark II had asked the European Council for a time extension that was 
denied. It is not unreasonable to suppose that, granted the extra time, the 
Convention would have put it to as good a use as it had in the first part of 
the text.
But the most telling criterion to judge of the Convention’s work efficiency 
lies with the IGC’s response to its conclusions. The two IGCs that followed 
Conventions took the latter’s proceedings into account in a most remar-
kable way since the Charter of Fundamental Rights was adopted “as is” 
by the European Council; the same who went on to uphold almost 90% 
of the Constitution text (in the Constitutional Treaty but also, albeit to a 
lesser extent in the Lisbon Treaty). In so doing, the Council was not only 
acknowledging the quality of the work completed, it also deemed it unne-
cessary to revisit a number of debates during which it had been possible 
for all feelings – including national - to be felt.
Whereas the Convention had originally been intended as a mere prepara-
tory body to aid the IGC’ work, just as a panel of experts might have done, 
the relationship between the two bodies was actually reversed. The import 
of the Convention’s activities, because of its greater democratic legitima-
cy and because of the public nature of its deliberations and outcomes, 
prevailed over the IGC whose room for manoeuvre probably ended up 
tighter than the Heads of State and Government had anticipated on the 
day they somehow confirmed the model in Laeken.
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II - Six proposals to reform the Convention
The supposedly undemocratic nature of the Convention’ activities and its 
lack of transparency were one of the points brought up by the “No” camp 
and which was aired at length in the civic debates of the countries which 
had a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty, particularly in France. Given 
the arguments developed above, this analysis rather points to the disin-
genuousness of a number of nonistes. Yet sweepingly to dismiss these 
views would be counterproductive. Besides, more considered criticisms 
were expressed by stakeholders in the process and by observers. The 
Convention was only on its second outing and withal under a mandate very 
different from the Convention’s Charter. It is therefore normal to take stock 
of its operation both on counts of democracy and efficiency and to look 
into means to improve it.
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2.1. A more “representative” and transparent composition
The composition of the Convention is undoubtedly one of the major issues 
at stake for the model’s future as it plays a key role in the perception of its 
nature as democratic or otherwise. As was stressed above, the democratic 
legitimacy of those participating in the Conventions was unquestionable 
since they all owed it – more or less directly –to popular vote. It remains 
that they had not been elected for the specific purpose of recasting the 
treaties in force.
As was also said earlier, the mix between representatives from Member 
States governments and MPs is essential in order to account for the double 
legitimacy of the Union and to ease the interface between Convention and 
IGC, indeed, in due course to envisage that the former supplant the latter. 
This is why, also taking into account the practical difficulties of such an 
exercise, the election of an assembly for the sole purpose of revising the 
treaties is not, in our view the solution to this problem. If the representa-
tion of Convention mark II (national and Euro MPs, representatives of the 
Governments and the Commission) is to be preserved, how then can its 
“representative” value be reinforced with the citizenry?
A dedicated election is hard to contemplate. It is nevertheless possible 
to come up with three procedures for components appointments offering 
greater transparency. First, the election of the European Parliament offers 
the opportunity to turn the eventuality of a Convention into a proper cam-
paigning issue: candidates would have to explain what reforms they 
would fight for as a matter of priority should a Convention on the future 
of the Union be called. Secondly, there should be a provision enabling a 
State to organise the election of representatives from the national par-
liament, for instance alongside other national regional or local elections, 
in order to avoid the cost of an election to that sole end. Whatever the 
case, should national MPs be chosen by their peers, their appointment 
should be conducted with the utmost transparency by means of a debate 
in Parliament, open to the public and broadcasted on a television channel. 
As for the appointment of government representatives, it should also be 
made publicly, with the Head of State or Government accounting for his/
her decision in Parliament and in the media.
When it comes to the overall number of Convention Members, keeping the 
number to around 200 seems acceptable. Meanwhile, the rather artificial 
distinction between full members and alternates could be suppressed. 
The allocation of seats by alphabetical order rather than along of existing 
cleavages (by component, party or country) also seems worth holding on 
to for this formula is the only one which leaves the door open to every 
possible type of alliance. Two aspects of the composition of Convention II 
are however in need of improvement. First an effort must be made to ensure 
a better female representation. Only 40 Members, or 1/5 of Convention II, 
were women.
Finally (for the second aspect), the Commission representation, gone from 
one to two people between Convention I and Convention II remains ina-
dequate. The Commission’s lack of clout within the Convention on the 
Future of Europe was to a great extent due to the muddle resulting from the 
“Penelope” project. The latter, which happens to be a first rate document, 
had been commissioned by President Prodi to a group of civil servants. It 
was intended as the Commission’s proposal for a constitutional text but 
the Commissioners delegated to the Convention had no knowledge of it. 
This regrettable episode not withstanding, it would be sensible to consider 
reinforcing the role of the Commission beyond its two Commissioner-
members, for instance by granting all Commissioners observer status, 
ensuring that Commissioners attend working groups relevant to them and 
by setting up hearings for some of them in plenary sessions.
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2.2. A more legitimate Praesidium, more open to dialogue
The Convention on the Future of Europe was chaired by Valéry Giscard 
d’Estaing, former President of the French Republic, assisted by two Vice-
Chairmen, one-time Prime Ministers Jean-Luc Dehaene of Belgium, and 
Giuliano Amato of Italy. This triumvirate was nominated by the Laeken 
European Council in December 2001. The Heads of State and Government 
also agreed at Laeken on the composition of the Praesidium that is the 
core group assisting the above mentioned triumvirate and responsible for 
organising the Convention’s activities. Nine Convention Members, chosen 
by each component were added to make up the Praesidium, namely three 
representatives of the Governments running the Presidency during the 
Convention’s tenure, two national MPs, two Euro MPs and two members 
of the Commission. One of the Convention’s first decisions was to add 
to these 12 a representative of the applicant countries: they nominated 
Slovenia’s A. Peterle. The Praesidium was comprised of 13 people all told.
All the analyses show that this outfit, which had first sight of the whole 
documentation produced by the Secretariat before any of it were passed 
to the Convention, played a major part in the Convention’s operation and 
this in spite of some internal tensions that may have surfaced with time. 
However, its composition and modus operandi had been rather perfuncto-
rily thought through and both were the butt of much criticism during and 
after the Convention’ activities, not all of it unjustified.
Before considering a few suggestions to address these criticisms, the 
essential function held by the Convention Secretariat ran by former UK 
Permanent Representative to the European Union, Sir John Kerr must get a 
mention. Made up with 15 drafters drawn from the European institutions or 
national diplomatic services working full time throughout the Convention’s 
activities, it conducted the fundamental business of drafting proposals 
to be submitted to the Convention’s deliberations and selecting the 
amendments tabled by Members. Fairly balanced and highly competent, 
the Secretariat hardly needs changing either its composition or modus 
operandi but for a closer collaboration with the European Commission.
As against that, the Praesidium of a future Convention could do with more 
significant modifications aimed at reaching a correct balance between the 
general course set by the European Council and the Convention’s autonomy 
on the one hand and on the other, greater transparency and efficiency in 
its work. By stating the names of the personalities intended to make up 
the driving triumvirate and fixing the categories and number of Members 
required to form the Praesidium, the European Council set this body pretty 
constraining parameters. The convention was allowed some room for 
manoeuvre as shown by the adjunction of a thirteenth member but it could 
probably do with more in order to ensure the praesidium’s better represen-
tativity hence greater legitimacy. Convention members do need to identify 
with the Praesidium.
It is proposed to maintain a triumvirate of one chairman and two Vice-
Chairmen, though no longer imposed but proposed by the European 
Council to the Convention to whom it will fall to approve that team or not. 
The Convention’s components would then have the task to appoint to the 
Praesidium their “representatives” thereafter responsible to keep – within 
reason to ensure the efficiency of the Praesidium’s work – the members of 
their component informed of the evolution of the discussions within the 
Praesidium. The idea would be to provide for two members by component, 
including those representing the governments, who could be taken from 
the country holding the Presidency and the one next in line.6
6 Even if it came to a rotation of the government’s representatives should the Convention term 
outlast two Presidencies of the Council.
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The presence of three government representatives within the Praesidium 
does not appear necessary. With the three leading members appointed by 
the Council, the weight of the governments within the Praesidium is already 
preponderant. Component representatives’ mandate could be renewed 
half way through, which would give members of the convention the oppor-
tunity to express their displeasure if Praesidium members neglected their 
reporting duties. The option should be there for one of the members to 
represent candidate states, as was the case in Convention II, but only in 
comparable situations, that is when the accession of the states concerned 
were imminent. Given two Commission representatives, two government 
representatives, a chairing team of three as before and two representati-
ves for the European and National Parliaments components, that would 
bring the Praesidium membership to 10 (possibly 11 with a member from 
applicant countries).
Among the Preasidium’s jobs that gave it undoubted power over the 
Convention was the setting up of working groups. The lengthy discussion 
surrounding the creation of a working group on social questions, original-
ly rejected by the Chairman, is a case in point. Hence the need to nurture 
sound links between Praesidium Members and their component in order 
for the latter’s wishes to be duly taken into account. Working groups 
can also be an opportunity for the Commission to reinforce its influence 
through the provision, say, for a Commissioner or a Commission senior 
official competent in the field addressed by a group to join it.
2.3. A mandate and schedule fixed by Wise Men
If there is one issue that strikes right at the core of a more effectively and 
democratically run Convention, it is the outlining of its working mandate. 
given the task to draft a Charter of Fundamental Rights, the first Convention 
had a relatively circumscribed mandate: it was to codify the whole array 
of existing rights in a single text, the status of which – political or legally 
binding – would be fixed by the European Council. The Mandate of the 
Convention for the Future of Europe was broader and more open-ended, 
even though it had singled out four main themes: the allocation and defini-
tion of EU competences, the simplification of the European Union’s instru-
ments, more democracy, transparency and efficiency within the EU and the 
simplification and reorganisation of the treaties. The Convention observed 
this mandate but fairly substantially upped its ambitions since, from the 
outset, the Chairman proposed to aim for a single text (rather than, as had 
been provided in one of the two options put forward by the Council, for a 
range of options) and for this text to be a Constitution.7
As the European Union is founded in treaties between Member States, 
it is not unreasonable for the European Council to work out an outline 
of the mandate assigned to the Convention. Equally, it is no less fitting 
for the Convention to be able to enjoy a degree of autonomy towards the 
initial mandate. There are however two snags to steer clear of. The fact 
that its mandate is somehow “imposed” on it by the European Council may 
present the Convention with the temptation to break free. If the manner 
of its answer is not in tune with the collective will of the Member States it 
may find itself on a path strewn with difficulties. Without getting into the 
debate over the real nature of the Constitutional Treaty, it is an averred fact 
that the name of “Constitution” which the Convention chose to give the 
text resulting from its proceedings caused unease in several countries, be 
it in the United Kingdom, which does not have a written constitution in its 
own right or in France where the no-sayers warned against the so-called 
“constitutionalisation” of neo-liberal policies.
7 Even if the Laeken Declaration tentatively mentioned the prospect of the adoption in due course of 
a Constitution, the Convention clearly expanded the field of its mandate.
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The second – highly significant – snag to eschew regards the citizens’ 
feeling that they were not given a voice on what should have been a demo-
cratic body’s mandate to rethink the contents of the founding Treaties. For 
the Convention will only be fully legitimate in the eyes of the citizens if they 
are given the sense that they have an influence not only on the appoint-
ment of those who will represent them but also on the subjects they are 
meant to debate. These two requirements – avoiding a counterproductive 
show down with the European Council and giving the citizenry the feeling 
that it has a stake in the definition of the mandate – could give rise to a 
preliminary phase before the Convention begins its work. The European 
Council could ask a group of Wise Men to ponder, on the basis of a broad 
outline, what should be the mandate of the next Convention. The period 
of reflection opening with the sittings of this group could be the oppor-
tunity to set up citizens’ consultation mechanisms, the outcome of which 
could be passed on to the panel. This proposal will be enlarged upon in the 
section on civic dialogue.
Besides defining the mandate, the panel of experts would also be responsi-
ble for fixing the work schedule of the Convention as the time factor proved 
crucial to the running and the success of the Convention experiment. For 
instance, many Convention Members blamed the Praesidium for the too 
short period allocated to deliberation as compared to the listening phase. 
But above all one reason for the failure of ratifications, and particularly 
so in France, had to do with the timeframe. For the European Council had 
given the Convention a year to reach a final outcome. When the Convention 
expressed the wish to extend its activities in order to go further in re-
writing the third part of the text on policies, the European Council denied it 
this extension on the basis that the recasting of the third part did not form 
part of the Convention’s mandate.
Now everybody knows today how much Part III of the Constitutional Treaty 
– even though it mostly restated provisions which, for some of them, had 
existed ever since the Treaty of Rome – weighed in favour of the rejection 
of the text, particularly in France where the No-sayers claimed that it cast 
in stone the neo-liberalism inherent to EU policies. Again, in order to avoid 
this tension between the Council and the Convention, it would probably 
be worth entrusting the evaluation of a proper timescale for Convention 
sittings to an instance that would not allow it room for brinkmanship but 
seek to ensure both the efficiency of the operation and its accessibility for 
the public at large. It would then be on the basis of these mandate and 
schedule proposals that the European Council would decide to call on a 
Convention.
2.4. An effective and even-handed consensual deliberative 
model 
From the moment the Convention composition is kept similar to the one 
in Convention II, consensual decision-making becomes mandatory as a 
general rule. Systematic voting would imply taking into account the Member 
States’ demographic weight in a more formal manner. As was explained 
above, consensus is not the same as unanimity. It supposes the support 
of a large, apparent majority of the participants. Two adjustments seem, 
however, the necessary counterpart to upholding the consensus rule.
First of all, the consensus rule can easily lead to an imbalance between 
Convention delegates and between components. Power of persuasion 
becomes a key issue, which is linked to speaking time and the way it is used. 
The President has the upper hand since he is the person who will declare 
a consensus reached or otherwise. This ascendancy is natural enough – 
it goes with a chair’s purview – but it must be set within as collegial as 
possible an exercise of the Praesidium. In the case when the consensus 
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seems less assured, the Praesidium should enjoy a right of evocation and 
rule collectively on whether it is fitting to proceed with the deliberation, 
including, as the case may be, after consulting every component on the 
matter. The same goes for the choice of topics intended for the ad hoc 
scrutiny of a working group. The Praesidium must be in a position to make 
proposals reflecting a genuine consensus.
Powers of persuasion and effective public speaking are also tightly linked 
to levels of preparation. Preparation supposes facilities and, in this respect, 
not all Convention components benefited from the same treatment. For 
whilst euro MPs operated on home ground with the full assistance they can 
avail themselves of in Brussels, national MPs did not benefit from similar 
local infrastructures and were disadvantaged by the frequent journeys they 
had to undertake. As for government representatives their ease was directly 
linked to their profile and their familiarity with European institutions. (the 
profile of the first persons appointed by the States varied quite noticea-
bly from one representative to the next, with some hailing from Academia 
and others from the political scene). A Foreign Secretary’s address would 
obviously get a ready audience. Should some national MPs be elected, as 
advocated above, to take part in the Convention, it is likely that the weight 
of their opinion would increase accordingly. Neither is it beyond the realm 
of the possible to make a secretariat and a few offices available to the 
national parliamentarians when in Brussels. 
Second possible adjustment to the consensus rule: allowing for a vote to 
be taken in some very circumscribed cases. For consensus is not necessa-
rily exclusive of voting. Two avenues are open: resorting to indicative voting 
when a deadlock seems intractable, or opting for a vote within Convention 
sub-groups. As an indicative vote is not binding, it has the advantage of 
reducing issues of representatives’ demographic weight whilst making it 
possible to measure the actual support enjoyed by the positions causing 
the deadlock. Those sub-groups could be the components, the political 
families or the working groups, the object being to give credence to some 
interventions when presented as representative of a majority view within 
one of those more restricted groups.
2.5. More widespread visibility and civic dialogue
The transparency of the Convention’s proceedings was ensured, as 
developed above, by the publicity of the debates and the ready availa-
bility of the documents but also by consultation with “civil society”. 
However, those two instruments rather failed to deliver since, on the one 
hand media coverage and people’s knowledge of the deliberations content 
proved wanting and, on the other hand, civil society organisations, whether 
consulted or not, were almost unanimous in their criticism of the expedi-
tious and poorly thought through nature of the consultation model. Should 
a Convention be called again, this aspect of the process is of the essence 
and must be reviewed in order to ensure its success.
This critical analysis must address at least two facets of the civic dialogue 
that are both distinct and closely connected. The first concerns matters 
relating to the consultation of organised civil society. In this field, Convention 
II was, as it were, feeling its way by resorting to the fairly standard method 
of hearings in the framework of a devoted “listening phase” and with little 
means to ensure a follow up with the organisations concerned. The model 
needs attention on both scores. Hearings and the option to file contribu-
tions on line or to direct them to particular members must of course remain 
available. But other consultation approaches, more sectoral and more deli-
berative (allowing for exchanges between different organisations as well) 
could be considered, and there is no need to interrupt them at the end of a 
hearing phase all in all rather contrived.
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It could, for instance, be arranged that each plenary be preceded by a civil 
society open forum the deliberations of which would be transcribed and 
transmitted to Convention Members before the opening of the plenary 
session. The same type of process could be applied to a sectoral approach, 
before working group meetings. Finally and so that this consultation be 
more than a purely formal exercise, a team attached to the Convention 
secretariat should be entirely dedicated to the analysis of civil society’s 
contributions and their dissemination among Members and even more 
to the feedback to give these organisations. The Economic and Social 
Committee whose job it is, among others, to liaise with civil society for 
European institutions could be given the task to organise this secretariat.
Yet, as many commentators pointed out, for all that this organised civil 
society consultation is crucial, it only gets through to what is known in 
political science as the “strong publics”, who, in Fraser’s terminology 
(1992) correspond to those who have the possibility to take part in insti-
tutionalised deliberation settings, whose pronouncements impact both on 
opinion forming and decision making. Meanwhile, it involves but poorly 
the “general publics” that is the public arena in which deliberation acts 
only towards opinion forming. 
The key question is therefore to ponder the different way to reach the 
“general public”, an objective but very partially reached by earlier conven-
tions. Two avenues are worth exploring. Citizens’ interest is first in direct 
proportion with the coverage the media give an event. Now the media 
did not much relay the Convention’s deliberations.  It would therefore be 
good to consider what elements are likely to increase media interest in the 
process. It is conceivable that the election of some national parliamenta-
rians would have the power both to clarify what is at stake for the citizens 
and the media and to stir up some expectations as to what they will do 
with their mandate. It is also likely that a third outing of the Convention 
would benefit from a tried and tested system in which some media already 
familiar with two Conventions will be adept at spotting in the deliberations 
the key moments liable to interest the citizens at large.
Besides, consensus does not exclude differences. It is important that 
Convention Members state clearly the points on which they agree and 
disagree so that the political tension is palpable. Yet, no matter how 
intense the confrontations and the rhetoric fireworks within the conven-
tion, media interest will remain in hock to what the Member States intend 
to make of it: will they appoint high-ranking representatives? Will they 
show willing to communicate on the issues at stake in the convention? 
We know today that a fair part of the EU’s communication deficit is linked 
to the schizophrenia of those national political leaders who stigmatise in 
their country what they had agreed to but a few days before in Brussels. 
The priority would therefore be for national leaders to play fair and respect 
the work of a Convention initiated by themselves.
There remains one more element crucial to the general public’s understan-
ding of the Convention’s debates. It is not enough to keep the debate alive 
in Brussels by bringing in civil society’s organisations with a shop window 
in the European capital. It is equally vital to facilitate the debate within 
each Member State, from the national to the local tier. Throughout the 
period devoted to the panel of experts’ and the Convention’s proceedings, 
each country must commit to keeping up the citizen’s interest as well as 
the media’s. And this purpose is too important to just get lip service, as 
was the case during the “period of reflection” which followed the negative 
results of the French and Dutch referenda.
The national promotion of the debate could go down at least two separate 
roads. The first could centre on national parliaments through the organisa-
tion of public meetings with government and parliamentary representati-
ves at the Convention. This would increase the chances of these meetings 
being broadcasted on one or more television channels. The second would 
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consist in using one of the many instruments of participative democracy 
in order to involve at every level citizens from all walks of life to the deli-
beration on the issues discussed in the Convention. From Citizens’ forums 
to Youth Parliaments up to and including deliberative polling, there is no 
shortage of instruments, and there should be inducements to use them 
through adequate funding. Websites accessing the Convention’s own 
should be set up in the Member States.
2.6. A more unassuming IGC and the Europeanisation of 
ratification
It is hard, nay unthinkable to come up with a Treaty revision process that 
were more effective, more democratic and more “European” without 
looking into the way this ties in with the principle of unanimous approval 
by EU Member States, whether through governments at the IGC which 
follows the Convention or on the occasion of the text’s ratification. This 
“double unanimity” requirement for the adoption and the ratification of 
treaties is bound to create numerous deadlocks in an enlarged Europe. This 
subject deserves a full study in its own right, which Notre Europe intends 
to produce. Admittedly, at this point in time, the mood is not to thinking up 
transformations comparable to those induced by the Convention approach. 
It remains no less necessary to highlight some implications of the use of a 
Convention for the phases of the IGC and of ratification.
Though it is conceivable in the long term for the Convention to supplant 
the IGC as the Treaty revision instance, as long as the EU remains founded 
in a classical international treaties system, these will have to be ratified by 
Member States governments gathered in an Intergovernmental Conference. 
We have, however, represented that maintaining government represen-
tatives in attendance at the Convention should allow for smoother rela-
tionships between the latter and the IGC. This also means that, in so far 
as the European Council has delegated the groundwork for the revision of 
the treaties to an other body, one within which national sensitivities can 
be aired, the IGC is left with a simple alternative: it can either ratify “as 
is” the text resulting from the Convention’s proceedings, as was the case 
following the Charter Convention, or modify it only marginally, as it did – or 
near enough – after the Convention on the Future of Europe. This division 
of labour between Convention and IGC should be the object of a steadfast 
agreement, short of which the Convention would be devoid of its democra-
tic essence and of its efficiency.
Such a disposition should include a mechanism allowing the continuation 
of a dialogue of sorts between the Convention and the IGC and, as far as 
it is possible, the preservation of the text resulting from the Convention’s 
proceedings. Keeping the Convention going throughout the IGC period 
could be a way forward but not necessarily the most effective as the aim is 
also to enable the Member States to arrive at an agreement, on the basis 
of the text already submitted by the Convention. The decision to break up 
the IGC to return to the Convention at such and such a juncture would be 
tricky. Badly timed, such an interruption could achieve the opposite of the 
desired effect by adding pressure on states who might harden positions 
now made public and on the Convention who might have to review some 
treaty provisions difficult though they were to achieve through a consensus 
between many concerns.
As against that, the Praesidium could indeed continue its existence during 
the IGC period with a two way information and overseeing brief. Supposing 
a breakdown of its members by topic, the Praesidium could have the charge, 
at first, to account for the Convention’s activities to the IGC as it opens, and 
thereafter according to the subjects under review and/or upon request for 
as long as it lasts. The Praesidium’s personalities would also remain res-
ponsible for informing the members of their component so that they may if 
necessary bring pressure to bear on their government to respect the spirit if 
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not the letter of the Convention’s achievement. Finally all the instruments 
furthering the transparency of the debates or the ready availability of the 
documents should remain in use during the IGC period, while the team 
responsible for the relations with civil society should also remain active. 
The idea behind these changes would be to prevent, while still allowing 
the efficiency of diplomatic negotiations, the convention’s open gates to 
slam shut during the IGC, thereby taking away from the citizens their right 
to information and the power to inflect the evolution of a text they or their 
representatives must later ratify at national level.
Let’s take a look at the ratification question. Whether in the shape of a 
referendum or of a parliamentary vote, the current UE treaties ratifica-
tion model requires the approbation of the text by each Member State. 
Rejection by one single state results in the death of the draft Treaty as it was 
originally submitted, as the French and Dutch “no” to the Constitutional 
Treaty in the spring of 2005 has shown. The options for a second vote in 
the Member States rejecting the text are in fact very limited. The occurren-
ces in Denmark in 1993 and Ireland in 20028 were feasible either because 
the reason for the rejection was identifiable, and could be addressed in 
a specific response or because the turn out had been very weak for the 
first vote. Besides, those were not very big countries. We know today that 
in a 27 Members Europe which will grow to more than thirty, the rise in 
deadlock probabilities for draft treaties at ratification stage has as much to 
do with politics as with maths.
The Convention opens a breach in the unanimity wall and the Member States 
have themselves set up simplified revision models via the so-called pas-
serelle clauses which will not require a ratification process. Nevertheless, 
in a Union that rests its legitimacy both on its citizens and its States – 
Nation States whose political tradition and culture are often steeped in 
8 The Danes had rejected the Maastricht Treaty by 52% of the vote in June 1992. They approved it 
by 57% of the vote in May 1993. The Irish, for their part, adopted  (63%) the Nice Treaty at a second 
referendum in 2002 (rejection in 2001 with 54% of the vote). 
a long history – the odds favour a persistent demand for unanimity.9 This 
needs not detract from an analysis of the means to organise these ratifica-
tions in a way compatible with the efforts to europeanise and democratise 
the revision model. First of all, it is paramount that ratification should take 
place over the same period of time in all Member States. This is the only 
way that it might be possible to decompartmentalise the diverse national 
debates and inject them with a European dimension.
Meanwhile, it behoves to anticipate what could be an adequate joint EU 
response in the event of non-ratification by one or more Member States. 
Hitherto, each episode was found an essentially political solution. Declaration 
30, annexed to the Constitutional Treaty recommended that if 4/5 of the 
Member States had ratified when other countries were experiencing difficul-
ties, the matter should be referred to the European Council. Its contents have 
now been incorporated to the Reform Treaty. This decision is of no great legal 
import since it gives no indications on the response the European Council 
may make. But it is not without interest, given that, for the first time, a rati-
fication threshold is being considered which if reached is vested with some 
political if not legal significance. It would be useful to dwell on its potential 
implications. First, it supposes that Member States as a whole respect the 
obligation the signature of the treaty places on a government to undertake 
a ratification process. One could also envisage this threshold as the point 
when the text has acquired enough legitimacy to form the basis of a rene-
gotiation which will uphold its substance. This threshold should also give 
rise to a closer examination of the ways to consider a differentiated imple-
mentation of a Draft Treaty, for instance by contemplating the possibility for 
Member States to allow the ratifying countries to form a sort of “vanguard”.
9 Even if the ratification of international treaties by a majority, qualified or not, exists in other 
international organisations (c.f. Henri Oberdroff’s paper for Notre Europe published in 2005). In the 
longer term a critical analysis of this question remains a non negotiable requirement for the EU, to 
which Notre Europe will devote a specific publication in 2008.
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Conclusion
The title of this paper is unambiguous. Let us not pass by this historical 
moment, this “Convention moment”. It is a culmination in the European 
construction we have experienced for nearly 60 years: a construction 
de facto, built on a “permissive consensus” between the elites and the 
European peoples which had been gradually frittered away under the joint 
effects of a growing sphere of community activity and a loss of clarity as to 
common objectives. A pragmatic model, which reflects the double legiti-
macy of the Union of states and citizens, the Convention which delivered 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Constitutional Treaty has proved 
to be a body the varied cleavages of which gave rise to fruitful and stimula-
ting debates, open to the public and civil society. It led an effective delibe-
ration and resulted in a consensual result, lifting constitutional blockages 
which had held back community dynamics for many years. The proceedings 
of both Conventions, commended for their achievement and their democra-
tic legitimacy, left the Intergovernmental Conferences which followed them 
no alternative to their adoption.
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The Convention model has, however, known only two outings with very 
different mandates. It was the butt of a number of criticisms not all of 
them unfounded. To form a clearer idea of its future, the ways to improve 
its modus operandi both on counts of democracy and efficiency must be 
considered. This paper has therefore put forward a number of proposals on 
the composition of the Convention, its Praesidium, its debating formulae, 
its dialogue with civil society, its visibility to the public at large, its rela-
tionships with the IGC and the implications there of for the ratification 
phase. It has further been suggested to create a group of Wise Men whose 
task it would be to think over its mandate and work schedule. These 
recommendations are a first contribution to the critical analysis on how 
to review the Convention model so as to make it the obvious tool towards 
the revision of the European Treaties and help diminish the gap separating 
today decision making institutions and European citizens.
Epilogue: a Convention on the Union’ policies post June 
2009?
A fine opportunity to organise a third edition of the Convention expe-
rience arises in the period following the 2009 elections. The work of the 
Convention on the Future of Europe has not been completed. Many think 
– and among them many Convention delegates – that the third part of 
the Constitutional Treaty on Union policies should get a more thorough 
recasting. Some of the formulations in the Treaty still go back to the sixties; 
an update taking on board the acquis communautaire would be a minimum 
requirement. But there is more at stake than revamping. The Union must 
open a debate on the European Project it wishes to harbour in the context 
of globalisation and in the face of the 21st century’s geopolitical issues. 
This project is then to be reflected in a set of policies to be run jointly.  The 
citizens need to understand what a European project for tomorrow is to be 
made of. Defining it on a wing and a prayer, behind closed doors via a string 
of European councils and IGCs would be missing a unique opportunity to 
recreate the affectio societatis which appears to be in short supply within 
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the EU today. In 2013, the European Union will implement new financial 
prospects. It would be a shame to get into discussions on the European 
budget before openly debating the policies the EU wishes to develop.
The prospect of a Convention on Union policies to start in the second 
semester of 2009 would make it possible to use the European elections 
to choose the national and euro MPs who would sit at the Convention. It 
would also make it possible to entrust the Reflection Group chosen at the 
December 2007 European Council to think over the mandate and schedule 
for this Convention which could meet from the autumn of 2009 to the end 
of 2010. Its work could then be confirmed by a short IGC which, ratified, 
would lead to determining on a more democratic and transparent basis 
the political and budgetary priorities for 2013 and beyond. This is a great 
opportunity for The EU to make a grand entrance into a century which could 
become that of a true citizens’ Europe, stronger in the model and the values 
she wishes to uphold in the world.
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